State Trading Corpn. of India, Ltd. v. CTO (1964) 4 SCR 99
Writ Petns. Nos. 202 to 204 of 1961 decided on 26/07/1963
Headnote
(A) Constitution of India , Art.5, Art.6, Art.7, Art.8, Art.9, Art.10, Art.12, Art.19, Art.32, Part II, Part III— Citizenship Act (57 of 1955) , S.2(1)(f), S.3, S.4, S.5, S.6, S.7, S.11— Citizen – Includes only natural persons and not juristic persons like corporations – Citizen in Art. 19 has same meaning as that in Part 11 – State Trading Corporation a company registered under Companies Act 1956 – Not a citizen – Cannot maintain petition under Art. 32 for enforcement of fundamental right under Art.19 – State Trading Corporation whether a department of Government.
AIR 1953 Raj 188 and AIR 1961 Cal 258 and AIR 1959 Cal 45 and AIR 1953 Assam 177, Impliedly overruled.
Per Majority, (Shah and Das Gupta, JJ. contra) :
The State Trading Corporation, a company registered under the Indian Companies Act,1956, is not a citizen within the meaning of Art. 19 of the Constitution and cannot ask for the enforcement of fundamental rights granted to citizens under the said article.(Para 23 31 64)
The provisions of Part III of the Constitution make it clear that the makers of the Constitution deliberately and advisedly made a clear distinction between fundamental rights available to ‘any person’ and those guaranteed to ‘all citizens’. In other words, all citizens are persons but all persons are not citizens, under the Constitution.(Para 11)
The rights of citizenship envisaged in Art. 19 are not wholly appropriate to a corporate body. In other words, the right of citizenship and the rights flowing from the nationality or domicile of a corporation are not conterminous. The maker of the Constitution had altogether left out of consideration juristic persons when they enacted Part II of the Constitution relating to “citizenship” and made a clear distinction between “persons” and “citizens” in Para III of the Constitution. Part III, which proclaims fundamental rights, was very accurately drafted, delimiting those rights like freedom of speech and expressions, the right to assemble peaceably, the right to practice any profession etc., as belonging to “citizens” only and those more general rights like the right to equality before the law, as belonging to “all persons”.(Para 12)
Corporations may have nationality in accordance with the country of their incorporation; but that does not necessarily confer citizenship on them. Part II of the Constitution when it deals with citizenship refers to natural persons only. This is further made absolutely clear by the Citizenship Act which deals with citizenship after the Constitution came into force and confines it only to natural persons. These two provisions are completely exhaustive of the citizens of this country and these citizens can only be natural persons. The fact that corporations may be nationals of the country for purposes of international law will not make them citizens of this country for purposes of municipal law or the Constitution. The work “citizen” used in Art.19 of the Constitution was not used in a different sense from that in which it was used in Part II of the Constitution. Observations of Mukherjee, J. in AIR 1951 SC 41, Held obiter. AIR 1554 SC 119 and (S) AIR 1955 SC 661, Considered.
Per Hidayatullah, J. (concurring):
The word ‘citizen’ in Art. 19(1) (f) and (g) has no special meaning and refers to a natural person. The State Trading Corporation cannot be regarded either by itself or .by taking it as the aggregate of citizens, as a citizen for purpose of enforcing rights under Art.19 (1) (f) and (g). The nationality of a corporation is a different concept not to be confused with citizenship of natural persons. The State Trading Corporation is really a department of Government behind the corporate veil and it is not possible to pierce the veil of incorporation in India to determine the citizenship of the members and then to give the corporation the benefit of Art. 19. The corporation cannot claim to enforce fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution against the State as defined in Art. 12.(Para 31 64 68)
Per Das Gupta J. (Contra) :
(1) The State Trading Corporation, so long as it consists wholly of citizens of India, can ask for enforcement of the fundamental rights granted to citizens under Art.19(1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. (2) The State Trading Corporation is not a department or organ of the Government of India and can claim to enforce the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution against the State as defined in Art.12 thereof.(Para 89)
The Constitution makers when they used the word “citizen” in Art. 19 intended that at least a corporation of which all the members were citizens of India would get the benefit of the fundamental rights enshrined in that Article. The legal position that the corporation is a distinct entity from its members does not appear to create any real difficulty in the way of giving effect to this intention.(Para 83)
Per Shah, J. (Contra):
(1) The State Trading Corporation a company registered under the Indian Companies Act 1956 is a citizen within the meaning of Art.19 of the Constitution and can ask for the enforcement of fundamental rights granted to citizens under the said article; and (2) The State Trading Corporation is, notwithstanding the formality of incorporation under the Indian Companies Act 1956, not a department and organ of the Government of India with the entirety of its capital contributed by Government. Even if the State Trading Corporation be regarded as a department or organ of the Government of India, it will, if it be a citizen, competent to enforce fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution against the State as defined in Art. 12 of the Constitution. There is no warrant for restricting the enforcement of those rights on some implication that an agent or servant of the State if he or it be a citizen cannot enforce the fundamental rights against another body which can be regarded also as a State within the meaning of Art.12 of the Constitution.(Para 90 117 118)
The State Trading Corporation has been constituted not by any special statute or charter but under the Indian Companies Act a Private Limited Company. It may be wound up by order of a competent Court. Though it functions under the supervision of the Government of India and its Directors, it is not concerned with performance of any governmental functions.
Its functions being commercial, it cannot be regarded as either a department or an organ of the Government of India. It is a circumstance of accident that on the date of its incorporation and thereafter its entire share-holding was held by the President and the two Secretaries to the Government of India. (1954) AC 584, Rel on.(S) AIR 1955 SC 33 and AIR 1958 SC 507 -and AIR 1958 SC 578 and AIR 1960 SC 415 and AIR 1960 SC 923 and AIR 1961 SC 65 and AIR 1963 SC 548 referred to as proceeding on the assumption that a company is a citizen and competent to enforce fundamental rights under Article 19(1) (f), (g).(Para 113)
(B) Constitution of India , Art.5— International Law (Private) – Nationality and citizenship – Distinction between.
Per B. P. Sinha, C. J., S.K. Das, P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K N. Wanchoo and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ. :
The expressions “Nationality” and “Citizenship” are not interchangeable terms “Nationality” has reference to the jural relationship which may arise for consideration under international law. On the other hand ‘citizenship” has reference to the jural relationship under municipal law. In other words, nationality determines the civil rights of a person, natural or artificial particularly with reference to international law, whereas citizenship is intimately connected with civic rights under municipal law.
Hence all citizens are nationals of a particular State, but all nationals may not be citizens of the State. In other words, citizens are those persons who have full political rights as distinguished from nationals, who may not enjoy full political rights and are still domiciled in that country (vide P.). Weis-Nationality and Statelessness in International Law pp. 4-6; and Oppenheim’s International Law, Law 1 pp. 642 644(Para 18)
(For historical survey of the concept of nationality and citizenship, see paras 29 and 42 of the judgment of Hidayatullah J. and pares 96 to 100 of the judgment of Shah, J.)
(C) Companies Act (1 of 1956) , S.34— Company – Effect of incorporation.
Per Hidayatullah. J. :
Unlike an unincorporated company, which has no separate existence and which the law does not distinguish from its members an incorporated company has a separate existence and the law recognise it as a legal person separate and distinct from its members. This new legal personality emerges from the moment of incorporation and from that date the persons subscribing to the memorandum of association and other persons joining as members are regarded as a body corporate or a corporation aggregate and the new person begins to function as an entity.But the members who form the incorporated company do not poo1 their status or their personality. If all of them are citizens of India the Company does not become a citizens of India any more than if all are married the company would be a married person. The personality of the members has little to do with the persona of the incorporated company. The persona that comes into being is not the aggregate of the persona either in law or in metaphor. The corporation really has no physical existence; it is a mere ‘abstraction of law.’
(D) Constitution of India , Preamble— Interpretation of the Constitution – Courts should not proceed mechanically but should give effect to real intention.
Per Das Gupta, J.:
In interpreting the Constitution the Courts have to take a broad and liberal view of what has been provided and should not rest content with the mere grammarians’ role. If, as it undoubtedly true, a syllogistic or mechanical approach of construction and interpretation of statutes should always be avoided, it is even more important when we construe a Constitution that we should not proceed mechanically but try to reach the intention of the Constitution makers by examining the substance of the thing and to give effect to that intention, if possible.(Para 76)
(E) Constitution of India , Preamble— Expressions used in Constitution – Liberal interpretation.
Per Shah, J.:
In ascertaining the meaning of expression used in a vital document like the Constitution of a nation a mechanical approach would be impermissible. The Constitution is but the declaration of the will of the people, and must be interpreted liberally, and not any narrow or doctrinaire spirit. It must be interpreted according to its true purpose and intent as disclosed by the phraseology in its natural signification-in the light of its setting and its dynamic character which is intended to fulfil the aspirations of the people.
(This rule was applied in determining whether the word “Citizens” in Art. 19 included only natural persons or even artificial persons like corporations).(Para 93)
Cases referred
Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed., p. 113,114, para 235, para 13
Judgement
In these three writ-petitions the State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. and K.B. Lal who, at the time of the filing of the petitions was Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, but is no longer holding such office now, are the petitioners who seek relief against the State of Andhra Pradesh in two of the petitions and the State of Bihar in the third petition by the issuance of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ or direction for quashing the orders of a Commercial Tax Officer of the State concerned, assessing the Corporation to sales tax and also for quashing the notice of demand issued to them for payment of the sum assessed.
B.P. SINHA, C.J. – The following two questions have been referred to the Special Bench by the Constitution Bench before which these cases came up for hearing.
(1) Whether the State Trading Corporation, a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, is a citizen within the meaning of Article 19 of the Constitution and can ask for the enforcement of fundamental rights granted to citizens under the said article; and
(2) whether the State Trading Corporation is, notwithstanding the formality of incorporation under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, in substance a department and organ of the Government of India with the entirety of its capital contributed by Government; and can it claim to enforce fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution against the State as defined in Article 12 thereof.
2. As the whole case is not before us, it is necessary to state only the following facts in order to appreciate how the controversy arises. The State Trading Corporation of India Ltd., and K.B. Lal, the then Additional Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industries, Government of India, moved this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution for quashing by a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order, certain proceedings instituted by or under the authority of the respondents, – (1) The Commercial Tax Officer, Visakhapatnam; (2) the State of Andhra Pradesh; and (3) the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kakinada. Those proceedings related to assessments of sales tax under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Sales Tax Act. Writ Petitions 202 and 203 of 1961 are between the parties aforesaid. In Writ Petition 204 of 1961, the parties are the petitioners aforesaid against (1) the Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, I/c Chaibasa Sub-Circle, Bihar State; (2) the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, Ranchi and (3) the State of Bihar. Thus, the petitioners are the same in all the three cases, but the respondents are the State of Andhra Pradesh and its two officers in the first two cases and the State of Bihar and its two officers in the third case.
3. The first petitioner is a private limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, with its head office at New Delhi, in May 1956. The second petitioner is a shareholder in the first petitioner company. The two petitioners claim to be Indian citizens as all its shareholders are Indian citizens. Proceedings were taken for assessment of sales tax, and in due course of those proceedings demand notices were issued. It is not necessary for the purposes of deciding the two points referred to us to set out the details of the assessments or the grounds of attack raised by petitioners. It is enough to say that the petitioners claim to be Indian citizens and contend that their fundamental rights under Article 19 of the Constitution had been infringed as a result of the proceedings taken and the demands for sales tax made by the appropriate authorities. When the case was opened on behalf of the petitioners in this Court, before the Constitution Bench, counsel for the respondents raised the preliminary objections which have taken the form now indicated in the two questions, already set out. The Bench rightly pointed out that those two questions were of great constitutional importance and should, therefore be placed before a larger Bench for determination. Accordingly they referred the matter to the Chief Justice and this larger Bench has been constituted to determine those questions.
5. Before dealing with the argument at the Bar, it is convenient to set out the relevant provisions of the Constitution. Part III of the Constitution deals with Fundamental Rights. Some fundamental rights are available to “any person”, whereas other fundamental rights can be available only to “all citizens”. “Equality before the law” or “equal protection of the laws” within the territory of India is available to any person (Article 14). The protection against the enforcement of ex-post-facto laws or against double-jeopardy or against compulsion of self-incrimination is available to all persons (Article 20); so is the protection of life and personal liberty under Article 21 and protection against arrest and detention in certain cases, under Article 22. Similarly, freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion is guaranteed to all persons. Under Article 27, no person shall be compelled to pay any taxes for the promotion and maintenance of any particular religious denomination. All persons have been guaranteed the freedom to attend or not to attend religious instructions or religious worship in certain educational institutions (Article 28). And, finally, no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law and no property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned except in accordance with law, as contemplated by Article 31. These in general terms, without going into the details of the limitations and restrictions provided for by the Constitution, are the fundamental rights which are available to any person irrespective of whether he is a citizen of India or an alien or whether a natural or an artificial person. On the other hand, certain other fundamental rights have been guaranteed by the Constitution only to citizens and certain disabilities imposed upon the State with respect to citizens only. Article 15 prohibits the State from discriminating against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, etc, or from imposing any disability in respect of certain matters referred to in the Article. By Article 16, equality of opportunity in matters of public employment has been guaranteed to all citizens, subject to reservations in favour of backward classes. There is an absolute prohibition against all citizens of India from accepting any title from any foreign State, under Article 18(2), and no person who is not a citizen of India shall accept any such title without the consent of the President, while he holds any office of profit or trust under the State [Article 18(3)]. And then we come to Article 19 with which we are directly concerned in the present controversy. Each one of these guaranteed rights under clauses (a) to (g) is subject to the limitations or restrictions indicated in clauses (2) to (6) of the Article. Of the rights guaranteed to all citizens, those under clauses (a) to (e) aforesaid are particularly apposite to natural persons whereas the freedoms under clauses (f) and (g) aforesaid may be equally enjoyed by natural persons or by juristic persons. Article 29(2) provides that no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or State -aid on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. This short resume of the fundamental rights dealt with by Part III of the Constitution and guaranteed either to ‘any person’ or to ‘all citizens’ leaves out of account other rights or prohibitions which concern groups, classes or associations of persons, with which we are not immediately concerned. But irrespective of whether a person is a citizen or a non-citizen or whether he is a natural person or a juristic person, the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of their respective rights has been guaranteed by Article 32.
6. It is clear on a consideration of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution that the makers of the Constitution deliberately and advisedly made a clear distinction between fundamental rights available to ‘any person’ and those guaranteed to ‘all citizens’. In other words, all citizens are persons but all persons are not citizens, under the Constitution.
7. The question next arises: What is the legal significance of the term “citizen”? It has not been defined by the Constitution. Part II of the Constitution deals with “Citizenship”, at the commencement of the Constitution. Part II, in general terms, lays down that citizenship shall be by birth, by descent, by migration and by registration. Every person who has his domicile in the territory of India shall be a citizen of India, if he was born in the territory of India or either of whose parents were so born or who has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years immediately preceding the commencement of the Constitution (Article 5). Secondly, any person who has migrated to the territory of India from the territory included in Pakistan shall be deemed to be a citizen of India, if he satisfied the conditions laid down in Article 6(a) and 6(b)(i). Any person who does not come within the purview of Article 6(a) and 6(b)(i), but who has migrated to India and has been registered, as laid down in Article 6 (b)(ii), shall also be deemed to be a citizen of India. Similarly, a person of Indian origin, residing outside India, shall be deemed to be a citizen of India if he has been registered as such by an accredited diplomatic or consular representative of India in the country where he has been residing (Article 8). Persons coming within the purview of Articles 5, 6 and 8, as aforesaid, may still not be citizens of India if they have migrated from India to Pakistan, as laid down in Article 7, or if they have voluntarily acquired the citizenship of any foreign State (Article 9). Those, in short, are the provisions of the Constitution in Part II relating to ‘Citizenship’, and they are clearly inapplicable to juristic persons.
By Article 11, the Constitution has vested Parliament with the power to regulate, by legislation, the rights to citizenship. It was in exercise of the said power that Parliament has enacted the Citizenship Act (LVII of 1955). It is absolutely clear on a reference to the provisions of this statute that a juristic person is outside the purview of the Act. This is an Act providing for acquisition and termination of Indian citizenship. The Constitution in Part II, as already indicated, has determined who are Indian citizens at the commencement of the Constitution. As the Constitution does not lay down any provisions with respect to acquisition of citizenship or its termination or other matters relating to citizenship, after the commencement of the Constitution, this law had to be enacted by way of legislation supplementary to the provisions of the Constitution as summarised above. The definition of the word “person” in Section 2(1)(f) of this Act says that the word “person” in the Act “does not include any Company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not”.
Hence, all the subsequent provisions of the Act relating to citizenship by birth, citizenship by descent, citizenship by registration, citizenship by naturalisation and citizenship by incorporation of territory have noting to do with a juristic person.
8. It is thus absolutely clear that neither the provisions of the Constitution, Part II, nor of the Citizenship Act aforesaid, either confer the right of citizenship on, or recognise as citizen, any person other than a natural person. That appears to be the legal position, on an examination of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Citizenship Act.
13. On an examination of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Citizenship Act aforesaid, we have reached the conclusion that they do not contemplate a corporation as a citizen. But Mr Setalvad, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, contended that Part II of the Constitution relating to citizenship is not relevant for our purposes because it does not define “a citizen” nor does it deal with the totality of “citizenship”. It was further submitted that the same is the position with reference to the provisions of the Citizenship Act. It is common ground, therefore, that the constitutional and the statutory provisions discussed above have no reference to juristic persons. But even so, it was contended, we have to review the legal position in the light of the pre-existing law, i.e., the Common Law, which, it was claimed, was preserved by Article 372 of the Constitution. In this connection, reference was made to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 6, 3rd Ed., p. 113,114, para 235, which lays down that, on incorporation, a company is a legal entity the nationality or domicile of which is determined by its place of registration. Reference was also made to Vol. 9 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, p. 19, paras 29-30, which say that the concept of nationality is applicable to corporations and it depends upon the country of its incorporation. A corporation incorporated in England has a British nationality, irrespective of the nationality of its members. So far as domicile is concerned, the place of incorporation fixes its domicile, which clings to it throughout its existence. It is not necessary to refer to other decisions, because the position is absolutely clear that a corporation may claim a nationality which ordinarily is determined by the place of its incorporation. But the question still remains whether “nationality” and “citizenship” are interchangeable terms. “Nationality” has reference to the jural relationship which may arise for consideration under international law. On the other hand “citizenship” has reference to the jural relationship under municipal law. In other words, nationality determines the civil rights of a person, natural or artificial, particularly with reference to international law, whereas citizenship is intimately connected with civic rights under municipal law. Hence, all citizens are nationals of a particular State, but all nationals may not be citizens of the State. In other words, citizens are those persons who have full political rights as distinguished from nationals, who may not enjoy full political rights and are still domiciled in that country.
14. In our opinion, it is not correct to say, that the expression “citizen” in Article 5 is not as wide as the same expression used in Article 19 of the Constitution. One could understand the argument that both the Constitution and the Citizenship Act have not dealt with juristic persons at all, but it is more difficult to accept the argument that the expression “citizen” in Part II of the Constitution is not conterminous with the same expression in Part III of the Constitution. Part II of the Constitution, supplemented by the provisions of the Citizenship Act (LVII of 1955) deals with “citizens” and it is not correct to say that citizenship in relation to juristic persons was deliberately left out of account so far as the Constitution and the Citizenship Act were concerned. On the other hand, the more reasonable view to take of the provisions of the Constitution is to say that whenever any particular right was to be enjoyed by a citizen of India, the Constitution takes care to use the expression “any citizen” or “all citizens”, in clear contradistinction to those rights which were to be enjoyed by all, irrespective of whether they were citizens or aliens, or whether they were natural persons or juristic persons. On the analogy of the Constitution of the United States of America, the equality clause in Article 14 was made available to “any person”. On the other hand, the protection against discrimination on denominational grounds (Article 15) and the equality of opportunity in matters of public employment (Article 16) were deliberately made available only to citizens.
15. We have already referred, in general terms, to those provisions of the Constitution, Part III, which guarantee certain rights to “all persons” and the other provisions of the same part of the Constitution relating to fundamental rights available to “citizen” only, and, therefore, it is not necessary to recount all those provisions. It is enough to say that the makers of the Constitution were fully alive to the distinction between the expressions “and person” and “any citizen”, and when the Constitution laid down the freedoms contained in Article l9(l)(a)-(g),as available to “all citizens”, it deliberately kept out all non-citizens. In that context, non-citizens would include aliens and artificial persons. In this connection, the following statement in Private International Law by Martin Wolff, is quite apposite:
“It is usual to speak of the nationality of legal persons, and thus to import something that we predicate of natural persons into an area in which it can be applied by analogy only. Most of the effects of being an ‘alien’ or a ‘citizen’ of the State are inapplicable in the field of corporations; duties of allegiance or military service, the franchise and other political rights do not exist.” (p. 308)
16. This apart, it is necessary to refer to another aspect of the controversy. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the distinction made by the Constitution between “persons” and “citizens” is not the same thing as a distinction between natural and juristic persons, and that as “persons” would include all citizens and non-citizens, natural and artificial persons, the makers of the Constitution deliberately left artificial persons out of consideration because it may be that the pre-existing law was left untouched. It is very difficult to accept the contention that when the makers of the Constitution were at pains to lay down in exact terms the fundamental rights to be enjoyed by “citizens” and those available to all “persons”, they did not think it necessary or advisable clearly to indicate the classes of persons who would be included within the expression “citizen”. On the other hand, there is clear indication in the provisions of Part III of the Constitution itself that they were fully cognizant of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America, where the Fourteenth Amendment (Section 1) clearly brings out the antithesis between the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States and life, liberty or property of any person, besides laying down who are the citizens of the United States. Section 1 aforesaid is in these terms and brings out the distinction very clearly:
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
17. The question may be looked at from another point of view. Article 19 lays down that “all citizens” shall have the right to freedoms enumerated in clauses (a) to (g). Those freedoms, each and all of them, are available to “all citizens”. The Article does not say that those freedoms, or only such of them as may be appropriate to particular classes of citizens, shall be available to them. If the Court were to hold that a corporation is a citizen within the meaning of Article 19, then all the rights contained in clauses (a) to (g) should be available to a corporation. But clearly some of them, particularly those contained in clauses (b), (d) and (e) cannot possibly have any application to a corporation. It is thus clear that the rights of citizenship envisaged in Article 19 are not wholly appropriate to a corporate body. In other words, the rights of citizenship and the rights flowing from the nationality or domicile of a corporation are not conterminous. It would thus appear that the makers of the Constitution had altogether left out of consideration juristic persons when they enacted Part II of the Constitution relating to “citizenship”, and made a clear distinction between “persons” and “citizens” in Part III of the Constitution. Part III, which proclaims fundamental rights, was very accurately drafted, delimiting those rights like freedoms of speech and expression, the right to assemble peaceably, the right to practise any profession, etc., as belonging to “citizens” only, and those more general rights like the right to equality before the law, as belonging to “all persons”.
18. In view of what has been said above, it is not necessary to refer to the controversy as to whether there were any citizens of India before the advent of the Constitution. It seems to us, in view of what we have said already as to the distinction between citizenship and nationality, that corporations may have nationality in accordance with the country of there incorporation; but that does not necessarily confer citizenship on them. There is also no doubt in our mind that Part II of the Constitution when it deals with citizenship refers to natural persons only. This is further made absolutely clear by the Citizenship Act which deals with citizenship after the Constitution came into force and confines it only to natural persons. We cannot accept the argument that there can be citizens of this country who are neither to be found within the four-corners of Part II of the Constitution or within the four-corners of the Citizenship Act. We are of opinion that these two provisions must be exhaustive of the citizens of this country, Part II dealing with citizens on the date the Constitution came into force and the Citizenship Act dealing with citizens thereafter. We must, therefore, hold that these two provisions are completely exhaustive of the citizens of this country and these citizens can only be natural persons. The fact that corporations may be nationals of the country for purposes of international law will not make them citizens of this country for purposes of municipal law or the Constitution. Nor do we think that the word “citizen” used in Article 19 of the Constitution was used in a different sense from that in which it was used in Part II of the Constitution. The first question, therefore, must be answered in the negative.
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