Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker AIR 1995 SC 2272

Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker    AIR 1995 SC 2272

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legitquest.com linkCivil Appeal No. 1305 of 1995 decided on 12/07/1995

Headnote

Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (2 of 1965) , S.18— Powers of appellate authority – Appellate authority constituted under S.18 functions as court and not as persona designata – Act providing limitation for filing appeal – Period of limitation not provided by Limitation Act – Act satisfies, twin conditions for attracting applicability of S.29(2) of Limitation Act – Consequently S.5 of Limitation Act as to condonation of delay would be attracted to appeals. AIR 1974 Kerala 162 (FB), Overruled. Limitation Act (36 of 1963) , S.29, S.5—

The appellate authorities as constituted under S.18 being the District Judges they constituted a class and cannot be considered to be persona designata. The appellate authority function as a Court. When the first schedule of the Limitation Act prescribes no time limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time limit for it, it can be said that under the first schedule of the Limitation Act all appeals can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period. While the former permits the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to be filed within the prescribed period. It is therefore, different from that prescribed in the former and thus S.29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act.Once the two conditions namely (i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application. (ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act are satisfied S.29(2) on its own force will get attracted to appeals filed before appellate authority under S.18 of the Rent Act. When S.29(2) applies to appeals under S.18 of the Rent Act, for computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeals under that Section all the provisions of Ss. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Section 5 being one of them would therefore get attracted. It is also obvious that there is no express exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act taking out the applicability of S.5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed before appellate authority under S.18 of the Act.Consequently, all the legal requirements for applicability of S.5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals in the light of S.29(2) of Limitation Act can be said to have been satisfied. It is therefore clear that the appellate authority constituted under S.18 of the Kerala Rent Act, 1965 functions as a Court and the period of limitation prescribed therein under S.18 governing appeals by aggrieved parties will be computed keeping in view the provisions of Ss. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Such proceedings will attract S.29(2) of the Limitation Act and consequently S.5 of the Limitation Act would also be applicable to such proceedings. Appellate authority will have ample jurisdiction to consider the question whether delay in filing such appeals could be condoned on sufficient cause being made out by the concerned applicant for the delay in filing such appeals.

It cannot be said that unless such courts functioning under special law or local law are constituted under the Civil Procedure Code, S.29(a) cannot apply to them. The express language of S.29(2) clearly indicates that such special or local law must provide for period of limitation for suit, appeal or application entertainable under such laws and for computing period of limitation under such special or local law the Legislature has made available the machinery of Ss.4 to 24 inclusive as found in Limitation Act. Nowhere it is indicated that as per S.29(2) the Courts functioning under such special or local law must be governed whole hog by Civil Procedure Code.(Para 16)

Judgement

S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. – In this appeal by special leave a short but an interesting question falls for determination. It is to the effect:

“(W)whether the appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rent Act’) has power to condone the delay in the filing of appeal before it under the said section”.

Majority of the Kerala High Court in the case of Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma [AIR 1974 Ker 162] has taken the view that the appellate authority has no such power. Following the said decision, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court by its judgment and order under appeal has dismissed the revision application moved by the appellant herein whose appeal before the appellate authority was dismissed as time barred and the application for condonation of delay was treated to be not maintainable before the appellate authority.
A few relevant facts leading to these proceedings may now be looked at. The appellant is a tenant occupying the suit premises belonging to respondent-landlord. The respondent filed Rent Control Petition No. 117 of 1992 before the Rent Control Court, Kannur, Kerala State, seeking eviction of the appellant-tenant under Section 11(2)(a)(b) and Section 11(3) of the Rent Act on the grounds of default in payment of rent and bona fide need for the purpose of conducting a grocery shop for his son, Plaintiff 2. The Rent Control Court exercising its power under Section 11 of the Rent Act passed an order for possession against the appellant on 28-10-1993. The appellant applied for a certified copy of the said order on 29-10-1993. He obtained a certified copy of the order on 23-11-1993. It is the case of the appellant that he entrusted on 4-12-1993 all the relevant papers to his counsel for filing appeal. His counsel called him in the next following week for signing the vakalatnama and for completing other formalities relating to filing of appeal. It is the further case of the appellant that he suffered paralytic attack on 5-12-1993 and was bedridden until 27-12-1993. On 28-12-1993 he came to know for the first time from his counsel that the time for filing appeal had elapsed. It may be noted at this stage that as per Section 18(1)(b) of the Rent Act an appeal has to be filed within thirty days from the date of order of Rent a Control Court. In computing thirty days, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against has to be excluded. Ultimately the appeal was filed by the appellant on 31-12-1993 before the appellate authority, namely, District Judge, Thalassery under Section 18 of the Act. The said appeal was also accompanied by IA No. 56 of 1994 for condonation of delay supported by the affidavit of the appellant. The appellate authority by its order dated 11-1-1994 dismissed the appeal as barred by time. The appellate authority took the view that being not a court but a persona designata it has no power to condone the delay in filing appeal by invoking the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. As noted earlier the said order of the appellate authority was confirmed by the High Court in civil revision petition moved by the appellant and that is how the appellant is before us.

The learned counsel for the appellant-tenant vehemently contended that the majority view of Kerala High Court in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma to the effect that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act cannot apply to the proceeding before the appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Act was not correct and that the appellate authority had full powers under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to consider on merits the question of condonation of delay in filing appeal as per Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel for the respondent-landlord on the other hand supported the decision rendered by the High Court.

As noted earlier the appellate authority, namely the District Judge, Thallassery has taken the view that since he is a persona designata he cannot resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing appeal before him. So far as this reasoning of the appellate authority is concerned Mr. Nariman, learned counsel for respondent fairly stated that he does not support this reasoning and it is not his say that the appellate authority exercising powers under Section 18 of the Rent Act is a persona designata. In our view, the said fair stand taken by learned counsel for respondent is fully justified. It is now well settled that an authority can be styled to be persona designata if powers are conferred on a named person or authority and such powers cannot be exercised by anyone else. The scheme of the Act to which we have referred earlier contraindicates such appellate authority to be a persona designata. It is clear that the appellate authority constituted under Section 18(1) has to decide lis between parties in a judicial manner and subject to the revision of its order, the decision would remain final between the parties. Such an authority is constituted by designation as the District Judge of the district having jurisdiction over the area over which the said Act has been extended. It becomes obvious that even though the District Judge concerned might retire or get transferred or may otherwise cease to hold the office of the District Judge his successor-in-office can pick up the thread of the proceedings from the stage where it was left by his predecessor and can function as an appellate authority under Section 18. If the District Judge was constituted as an appellate authority being a persona designata or as a named person being the appellate authority as assumed in the present case, such a consequence, on the scheme of the Act would not follow. In this connection, it is useful to refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prasad [AIR 1961 SC 606]. In that case Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court had to consider whether Additional District Magistrate empowered under Section 10(2) of Criminal Procedure Code to exercise powers of District Magistrate was a persona designata. Repelling the contention that he was a persona designata the learned Judge made the following pertinent observations:

A persona designata is ‘a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character’. (See Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn. p. 253). In the words of Schwabe, C.J. in Parthasarathi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao [AIR 1924 Mad 561], persona designata are ‘persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges’. The same consideration applies also to a well-known officer like the District Magistrate named by virtue of his office, and whose powers the Additional District Magistrate can also exercise and who can create other officers equal to himself for the purposes of the Eviction Act. The decision of Sapru, J. in the Allahabad case, with respect, was erroneous.

Applying the said test to the facts of the present case it becomes obvious that appellate authorities as constituted under Section 18 of the Rent Act being the District Judges they constituted a class and cannot be considered to be persona designata. It is true that in this connection, the majority decision of the High Court in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma also took a contrary view. But the said view also does not stand scrutiny in the light of the statutory scheme regarding constitution of appellate authority under the Act and the powers conferred on and the decisions rendered by it.

Once it is held that the appellate authority functioning under Section 18 of the Rent Act is not a persona designata, it becomes obvious that it functions as a court. In the present case all the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the Rent Act have been extended are constituted as appellate authorities under Section 18 by the Government notification noted earlier. These District Judges have been conferred the powers of the appellate authorities. It becomes therefore, obvious that while adjudicating upon the dispute between the landlord and tenant and while deciding the question whether the Rent Control Court’s order is justified or not such appellate authorities would be functioning as courts. The test for determining whether the authority is functioning as a court or not has been laid down by a series of decisions of this Court. We may refer to one of them, in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd. [IR 1967 SC 1494]. In that case this Court was concerned with the question whether the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies functioning under Section 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 was a court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. While answering the question in the affirmative, a Division Bench of this Court speaking through Mitter, J. placed reliance amongst others on the observations found in the case of Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain [AIR 1956 SC 66] wherein it was observed as under:

It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.

Reliance was also placed on another decision of this court in the case of Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab [AIR 1956 SC 153]. Following observations found therein were pressed in service:

It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declares the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a court.

When the aforesaid well settled tests for deciding whether an authority is a court or not are applied to the powers and functions of the appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Rent Act, it becomes obvious that all the aforesaid essential trappings to constitute such an authority as a court are found to be present. In fact, Mr. Nariman, learned counsel for respondent also fairly stated that these appellate authorities would be courts and would not be persona designata. But in his submission as they are not civil courts constituted and functioning under the Civil Procedure Code as such, they are outside the sweep of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It is therefore, necessary for us to turn to the aforesaid provision of the Limitation Act. It reads as under:

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its applicability to the facts of a given

case and for importing the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision.

There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application.

The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would automatically follow. These consequences are as under:

In such a case Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the Schedule.
For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.
In the light of the aforesaid analysis of the relevant clauses of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, let us see whether Section 18 of the Rent Act providing for a statutory appeal to the appellate authority satisfies the aforesaid twin conditions for attracting the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It cannot be disputed that Kerala Rent Act is a special Act or a local law. It also cannot be disputed that it prescribes for appeal under Section 18 a period of limitation which is different from the period prescribed by the Schedule as the Schedule to the Limitation Act does not contemplate any period of limitation for filing appeal before the appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Act or in other words it prescribes nil period of limitation for such an appeal. It is now well settled that a situation wherein a period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law for an appeal or application and for which there is no provision made in the Schedule to the, Act the second condition for attracting Section 29(2) would get satisfied. As laid down by a majority decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel [AIR 1964 SC 1099] when the First Schedule at the Limitation Act prescribes no time-limit for a particular appeal, but the special law prescribes a time-limit for it, it can be said that under the First Schedule of the Limitation Act all appeals can be filed at any time, but the special law by limiting it provides for a different period, while the former permits the filing of an appeal at any time, the latter limits it to be filed within the prescribed period. It is therefore, different from that prescribed in the former and thus Section 29(2) would apply even to a case where a difference between the special law and Limitation Act arose by the omission to provide for limitation to a particular proceeding under the Limitation Act.

It is also obvious that once the aforesaid two conditions are satisfied Section 29(2) on its own force will get attracted to appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18 of the Rent Act. When Section 29(2) applies to appeals under Section 18 of the Rent Act, for computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeals under that Section, all the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Section 5 being one of them would therefore get attracted. It is also obvious that there is no express exclusion anywhere in the Rent Act taking out the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed before appellate authority under Section 18 of the Act. Consequently, all the legal requirements for applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals in the light of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act can be said to have been satisfied. That was the view taken by the minority decision of the learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court in Jokkim Fernandez

Amina Kunhi Umma. The majority did not agree on account of its wrong supposition that appellate authority functioning under Section 18 of the Rent Act is a persona designata. Once that presumption is found to be erroneous as discussed by us earlier, it becomes at once clear that minority view in the said decision was the correct view and the majority view was an erroneous view.

It is also necessary to note the change in the statutory settings of Section 29(2) as earlier obtained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and the present Limitation Act of 1963. Section 29(2) as found in Indian Limitation Act, 1908 read as follows:

(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the First Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law –

the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and

(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.
As per this sub-section, the provisions contained in certain sections of the Limitation Act were applied automatically to determine the periods under the special laws, and the provisions contained in other sections were stated to apply only if they were not expressly excluded by the special law. The provision (Section 5) relating to the power of the court to condone delay in preferring appeals and making applications came under the latter category. So if the power to condone delay contained in Section 5 had to be exercised by the appellate body it had to be conferred by the special law. That is why we find in a number of special laws a provision to the effect that the provision contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the proceeding under the special law. The jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under the special laws is sometimes given to the ordinary courts, and sometimes given to separate tribunals constituted under the special law. When the special law provides that the provision contained in Section 5 shall apply to the proceedings under it, it is really a conferment of the power of the court under Section 5 to the tribunals under the special law – whether these tribunals are courts or not. If these tribunals under the special law should be courts in the ordinary sense an express extension of the provision contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act will become otiose in cases where the special law has created separate tribunals to adjudicate the rights of parties arising under the special law. That is not the intention of the legislature.

In view of the aforesaid provision of Section 29(2) as found in Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Section 5 would not have applied to appellate authorities constituted under Section 18 as Section 5 would not get attracted as per the then existing Section 29(2) of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 which did not include Section 5 as one of the provisions to be applied to such special or local laws. That appears to be the reason why during the time when the Limitation Act, 1908 was in force, the Rent Act of 1959 which is the forerunner of present Rent Act of 1965 contained a provision in Section 31 of that Act which read as under:

Application of the Limitation Act. – The provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (9 of 1908), shall apply to all proceedings under this Act.

After repealing of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and its replacement by the present Limitation Act of 1963 a fundamental change was made in Section 29(2). The present Section 29(2) as already extracted earlier clearly indicates that once the requisite conditions for its applicability to given proceedings under special or local law are attracted, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 both inclusive would get attracted which obviously would bring in Section 5 which also shall apply to such proceedings unless applicability of any of the aforesaid sections of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded by such special or local law. By this change it is not necessary to expressly state in a special law that the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the determination of the periods under it. By the general provision contained in Section 29(2) this provision is made applicable to the periods prescribed under the special laws. An express mention in the special law is necessary only for any exclusion. It is on this basis that when the new Rent Act was passed in 1965 the provision contained in old Section 31 was omitted. It becomes therefore apparent that on a conjoint reading of Section 29(2) of Limitation Act of 1963 and Section 18 of the Rent Act of 1965, provisions of Section 5 would automatically get attracted to those proceedings, as there is nothing in the Rent Act of 1965 expressly excluding the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals under Section 18 of the Rent Act.

In order to support his contention Mr. Nariman invited our attention to the relevant provisions of the Rent Act, namely, Sections 20, 22, 23 as well as second proviso to Section 11(1) and contended that a Rent Court functioning under the Rent Control Act is not a full-fledged civil court. If it was a full-fledged civil court there would have been no occasion for the legislature to provide that certain provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 will govern such proceedings. To that extent Mr. Nariman is right. We will proceed on the basis that Rent Court functioning under the Rent Act or for that matter the appellate authority adjudicating disputes between landlords and tenants in a judicial manner may not be considered strictly as civil courts fully governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Still the question remains whether only because of that their proceedings will go out of the provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Mr. Nariman submitted that Section 29(2) will apply only to the proceedings of those courts constituted under special or local law, which are civil courts, stricto sensu.
On the other hand, there are two decisions of this Court which have directly spoken on the point, and on which reliance was rightly placed by the counsel for appellant. The first decision rendered in the case of CST v. Madan Lal Das and Sons [(1976) 4 SCC 464] by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court was concerned with the question whether Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to revision petitions filed under Section 10 of the same U. P. Sales Tax Act. The appellant had contended that the time spent by him in obtaining certified copy of the order of the lower authority was required to be excluded for computing period of limitation for filing revision under Section 10, as per provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. Khanna, J. speaking for this Court held that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 12(2), inter alia, shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, and there is nothing in the U. P. Sales Tax Act expressly excluding the application of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the said provision was held applicable to the filing of revision applications under Section 10 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act. It becomes therefore obvious that the aforesaid decision clearly applied Section 29(2) to the revision petitions filed before revision authorities under a special law like U. P. Sales Tax Act and via Section 29(2) applied Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act to such revisional proceedings. Mr. Nariman contended that the said decision was per incuriam as the earlier decision of three learned Judges in CST

Parson Tools and Plants was not cited before them. As we have already held earlier the said decision proceeded on the language of Section 10(3)(B) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act for excluding the applicability of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. It had no relevance for deciding the question whether Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act could be applied to such revisional proceedings when there was no express exclusion of Section 12(2) by the special law, namely, the U. P. Sales Tax Act. Consequently, it cannot be said that the decision rendered by this Court in CST v. Madan Lal Das & Sons, was per incuriam. On the other hand, it is a direct decision on the point, namely, applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act for computing periods of limitation prescribed by local or special law even though the authority before which such proceeding may be filed under the local or special law may not be full-fledged civil courts.

Our attention was also invited by counsel for the appellant to a later decision of this Court in the case of Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti Ltd. v. Mahabir Sugar Mills (P) Ltd., [(1976) 4 SCC 158]. In that case a Bench of two learned Judges was concerned with the question whether Divisional Commissioner acting under the U. P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 acted as a revenue court or whether he was a persona designata. It was held that the Divisional Commissioner had been constituted as appellate authority under the Act. That showed that the Divisional Commissioner was made an appellate court not as persona designata but as a revenue court. That being so it was obvious that Section 5 of the Act applied to appeals before Divisional Commissioner and he could condone the delay in fling appeals. It becomes obvious that this Court in the aforesaid decision was dealing with revenue court constituted under U. P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, which was a special law. It was in terms held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable to revisional proceedings before such revenue courts. It is of course true as pointed out by Mr. Nariman that in the said decision no other decision of this Court was cited and Section 29(2) was not expressly referred to but the ratio of the decision is necessarily and implicitly based on the applicability of Section 29(2) but for which Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not have been made applicable to such revision proceedings before revenue court functioning under the special law. It has to be kept in view that Section 29(2) gets attracted for computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application to be filed before authorities under special or local law if the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied and once they get satisfied the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 shall apply to such proceedings meaning thereby the procedural scheme contemplated by these sections of the Limitation Act would get telescoped into such provisions of special or local law. It amounts to legislative shorthand. Consequently, even this contention of Shri Nariman cannot be countenanced.

Before parting with the discussion we may also note that a Division Bench of Madras High Court in the case of Rethinasamy v. Komalavalli [AIR 1983 Mad 45] took the view that the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was a special and local enactment and as Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act were not excluded in their application to the appeals filed under Section 23 of the Rent Control Act, Section 29(2) enabled the application of Sections 4 to 24 to Rent Control Courts. Consequently, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to an appeal preferred before the appellate authority, constituted under Section 23(1)(b) of the Rent Control Act. We entirely agree with the aforesaid view. In the said decision the majority view of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma was dissented from and the minority view as found therein was accepted. The said decision of the Madras High Court lays down the correct law and has rightly dissented from the majority view of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court and has rightly accepted the minority view as discussed by us earlier.

As a result of the aforesaid discussion it must be held that appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Rent Act, 1965 functions as a court and the period of limitation prescribed therein under Section 18 governing appeals by aggrieved parties will be computed keeping in view the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Such proceedings will attract Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and consequently Section 5 of the Limitation Act would also be applicable to such proceedings. Appellate authority will have ample jurisdiction to consider the question whether delay in filing such appeals could be condoned on sufficient cause being made out by the applicant concerned for the delay in filing such appeals. The decision rendered by the High Court in the present case as well as by the appellate authority taking contrary view are quashed and set aside. The proceedings are remanded to the court of the appellate authority. Rent Control Appeal filed before the said authority by the appellant is restored with a direction that the appellate authority shall consider IA No. 56 of 1994 filed by the applicant for condonation of delay on its own merits and then proceed further in accordance with law. Appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.

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